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Summary 
 
This study started with a question, why so many M&As failed. The reasons are various in 
accordance with how we handle with each step of the transactions from finding strategic reasons to 
integration implementation. Influenced by my previous work experiences and own personal interests, 
my focus moved to the integration of acquisitions. Integrating two different companies brings a lot of 
changes in the organizations, especially in acquired companies, and effective leadership is essential to 
overcome obstacles and resistances from the changes. However, the effective leadership isn’t given to 
new top management from acquiring companies naturally, but it is more likely to develop based on 
the degree to which the employees in acquired companies trust the top management. In the process of 
trust building, trustors determine the trustworthiness of trustees in the basis of how the trustors 
perceived the trustees’ behaviors. In the evaluating process of the behaviors, the trustors are affected 
by own propensity to trust such as individual characteristics and national culture. Based on the study 
above, I come up with my research questions as follows; 1) how national cultural propensity to trust 
influence the trust building process between new top management from acquiring companies 
(Trustees) and the employees in acquired companies (Trustors) in cross-border acquisitions, 
particularly in Japan and South Korea? and 2) what practices should be considered to facilitate or 
  
damage the trust building process? To answer these questions, I studied four integration cases in 
automobile industry, two from Japan and two from South Korea including one successful case and one 
failed case for each country. After observing and analyzing the cases, I found some common and 
different influencing factors between two countries. For example, in the case of common factors, 
facilitating communication and information sharing, making power balance in top management 
positions and paying respect are important to develop trust. For different factors, in the case of South 
Korea, providing employment security and top management’s experience based on seniority were 
played importantly to develop trust, on the other hand, in the case of Japan, actual performance of top 
management with strong leadership was regarded as one of influencing factors. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
According to J.P.Morgan, transaction volumes of global mergers and acquisitions (M&As) in 
2017 reached US$3.7 trillion including 30% of cross-border transactions. M&As have been major 
tools to create value through achieving synergy between acquiring and acquired companies. However, 
the outcome of M&As haven’t been promising as 50~70% or much higher percentage of deals failed 
to achieve the synergy estimated before and at the deal closing (Ashkenas & Francis, 2000; 
Christensen et el., 2011; Marks & Mirvis, 2001). The research (Schweiger et el.,1993) suggested that 
there are three major factors influence the success of M&As. Frist, a transaction must have strategic 
reasons (not solely financial or tax reasons). Second, the final purchase price shouldn’t be overpaid, 
which means that acquiring companies need to do appropriate analyses in valuation process. Last, the 
integration plan should be implemented effectively. It’s not clear how much impact of each factor 
influence the failure of M&As, but the last factor is assumed to represent one third of all merger 
failures (Kitching, 1973). 
In the integration process of M&As, it’s inevitable to avoid the organizational changes to 
realize the synergies, i.e. cost reduction, revenue increase, market consolidation and acquiring 
intangible assets (Schweiger & Very, 2003). These changes are executed under the newly appointed 
top managements who are transferred from the acquiring companies to the acquired companies to 
control the acquired business. (Shrivastava, 1986). A longitudinal study (Kavanagh & Ashkanasy, 
2006) explained that leaders need to be competent and trained enough to be perceived by the 
employees in acquired companies as authentic leaders and to lead them to the acceptance of the 
changes by mergers. Also, after acquisitions, leaders can play important roles to ease the psychological 
and emotional changes of employees, e.g. loss of identity and anxiety about the future, by handling 
the issues with honesty and treating people with dignity (Schweiger et el., 1987). In the perspective of 
strategy, leadership should give direction and purpose and guide integrated strategy formulation and 
implementation in M&As (Shrivastava, 1986). 
Leadership is imperative in the organizational changes; however, leadership isn’t given to 
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every leader. The effectiveness of leadership is the degree to which subordinates and co-workers trust 
the leaders (Burke et el., 2007). In the post M&A integration phase, trust is initially lacking due to a 
new organization, a new top management and new colleagues (Lubatkin et el., 1999; Marks & Mirvis, 
2001). In this sense, the new top management may not be accepted by existing employees of the 
acquired companies (Shrivastava, 1986). Then, when should the top management make efforts to build 
trust with the employees of the acquired companies? A case survey (Stahl et el., 2011) of fifty cases 
related to post-acquisition integration and trust issues suggested that the acquirers’ approach in the 
integration will affect the acquired companies’ employees trust in the top management rather than the 
pre-deal history and relationship. In sum, it’s essential for the top management to build trust in the 
integration process to make sure that their leadership is effective. 
If so, what is trust? Mayer et el. (1995) defined that trust is a willingness for a trustor to be 
vulnerable to the actions of a trustee based on the expectation that the trustee will perform a particular 
action important to the trustee without the ability to monitor or control the trustor. In the model of trust 
they proposed, trust is developed by perceiving trustworthiness of the trustee, and trustor’s propensity 
to trust will affect the likelihood the trustor will trust. The propensity to trust could be described as the 
general willingness to trust others, and the differences in developmental experience, personality and 
cultural background can define the degree of the propensity to trust. Their new published paper 
(Schoorman, 2007) suggests that the national culture can affect the perception of ability, benevolence, 
integrity, and the importance given to each of these variables in the proposed trust model in 1995. 
The purposes of my research are 1) to observe how national cultural trustor’s propensity 
influence the trust building process between top management from acquiring companies and the 
employees in acquired companies in cross-border acquisitions in Japan and South Korea, and 2) to 
find practices and factors for top management to facilitate the trust building process by understanding 
national cultural propensity to trust.  
To answer these questions, first, I will examine the national culture literature to define the 
national characteristics. Second, I will look at how national culture influence trust building process 
and apply the process to the contexts of, particularly, Japan and South Korea. Third, I will examine 
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four different post-acquisition integration cases, two from Japan and two from South Korea to analyze 
how different approaches of post-acquisition integration by the top management from the acquiring 
companies influence trust building process of the employees in the acquired companies. Lastly, I will 
explain some findings from the analyses and conclude with some implications in terms of trust 
building for the managers who pursues future acquisitions in Japan and South Korea. 
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Section 1. CHARACTERISTICS OF NATIONAL CULTURE 
According to Hofstede (1980), there are four dimensions of national culture, power distance 
index, individualism versus collectivism, uncertainty avoidance index, and masculinity versus 
femininity. The cultural dimensions represent individual preference for one over another that 
distinguish countries, rather than individuals, from each other (Hofstede insights). Each country is 
given scores of each dimension and the comparison of the scores between countries are relative.  
• Power distance index: This describes the degree to which less powerful people of a society accept 
and expect that power is distributed unequally. In high power distance societies, people accept a 
hierarchical order and believe everyone has each place to be, which means there is no need to 
justify the power. On the other hand, people in low power distance societies make an effort to 
distribute the power equally and ask justification of inequal power. The higher score means the 
higher power distance is. 
• Individualism versus collectivism: This index describes the degree to which people in society are 
knitted into groups. Individualistic societies expect people to take care of only themselves and 
their close families. People in collective societies have tightly integrated extended relationships 
with their relatives and members of ingroups. People in these ingroups help and look after each 
other with unquestioning loyalty. This index is explained as “I” versus “We”. The higher score 
means more individualistic is. 
• Masculinity versus femininity: Masculinity describes a preference in society for achievement, 
heroism, assertiveness and material rewards for success. Masculine society is competitive. 
Femininity describes a preference for cooperation, modesty, caring for the weak and quality of 
life. This society is consensus-oriented in general. The higher score means more masculine is.  
• Uncertainty avoidance index: This index describes the degree to which people can tolerate 
uncertainty and ambiguity, especially about the future which will be always unknown. In high 
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uncertainty avoidance societies, rigid codes of belief and behavior are maintained, and 
unorthodox codes are not tolerated. Low index societies are more accepting different beliefs and 
behaviors and more relaxed about practices than principles. The higher score means the higher 
uncertainty avoidance is.  
Section 2. HOW NATIONAL CULTURE INFLUENCES TRUST BUILDING PROCESS 
Doney et el. (1998) describes five cognitive trust building processes that help explain how trust 
develops. These five cognitive trust building processes are defined by behavioral assumptions based 
on the various theoretical perspectives. Whether trustors trust by a particular process is depending on 
these underlying behavioral assumptions being met. The behavioral assumptions are influenced by 
organizational, relational, or individual factors, however, they focus on how national culture influence 
the behavioral assumptions, eventually, the development of trust (Figure 1). Five cognitive trust 
building processes are described as calculative, prediction, intentionality, capability and transference. 
The characteristics of national culture (Hofstede, 1980) influence trustors’ likelihood to form trust via 
the processes. I will explain how each national culture dimension influence each cognitive process.  
 
Figure 1. Summarized version of Proposed Model of National Culture and the Development of Trust 
(Doney et el., 1998) 
 
• Calculative process: The economics literature suggests that the development of trust involves a 
calculative process. Most people behave opportunistically and seek self-interest, therefore, to 
establish trust, trustors must determine whether the trustees’ costs for being opportunistic exceed 
the benefits of maximizing self-interest. In this regard, trustors in individualist and masculine 
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cultures are more likely to trust trustees by the calculative process compared to trustors in 
collectivist and feminine cultures. Furthermore, the power distance dimension influences the 
development of trust. In low power distance culture, people tend to share the power and are more 
participative in decision making, which means it’s less likely to behave opportunistically. In 
uncertainty avoidance dimension, high uncertainty avoidance societies resist to change while low 
uncertainty avoidance societies are more willing to change which engages in opportunistic actions. 
In this regard, it’s more likely to form trust by the calculation process in low uncertainty 
avoidance cultures than high ones.  
• Prediction process: Trust is formed when trustors have confidence in predicting trustees’ future 
behaviors with accuracy. Trustors determine whether trustees are trustworthy by using 
information of trustees’ past actions. To establish trust, trustee’s consistent and predictable 
behaviors are important. In the national culture dimensions, individualist and masculine societies 
are more tolerant in variance and accepting inconsistency and independence. On the other hand, 
collectivist and feminine societies expect people act in unison to accomplish groups’ goals and 
pursue solidarity. Therefore, trustors in collectivist and feminine cultures are more likely to trust 
trustees by the prediction process compared to trustors in individualist and masculine cultures. 
The power distance dimension is about conformity versus independence. In high power distance 
cultures, people are expected to conform norms, which means people can predict others’ 
behaviors more easily than the ones from low power distance cultures. Thus, it’s more likely to 
develop trust by the prediction process in high power distance cultures. In the perspective of 
uncertainty avoidance dimension, high uncertainty avoidance societies desire to have clear rules 
to predict and control others’ behaviors. It shows that high uncertainty avoidance cultures are 
more likely to form trust by the prediction process compared to low uncertainty avoidance 
cultures which are more accepting variances.  
• Intentionality process: Trustors are more likely to form trust when they perceive trustees’ 
intentions and motives are benevolent. If trustees’ words and behavior are interpreted as selfish 
intention, trust is unlikely to develop. In individualist and masculine societies, it’s acceptable to 
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act opportunistically and have some degree of conflict. In contrast, collectivist and feminine 
societies expect people behave with benevolent motives. In this sense, trustors in collectivist and 
feminine cultures are more likely to trust trustees by the intentionality process compared to 
trustors in individualist and masculine cultures. In high power distance societies, all the decisions 
are made by ones at the top, and lower levels follow the decisions. Also, some degree of conflicts 
and competitions are acceptable. In this case, it may be hard to find benevolent intention from 
others. Thus, it’s more difficult to develop trust by the intentionality process in high power 
distance cultures compared to low power distance cultures. Uncertainty avoidance dimension 
addresses the degree to which people desire to continue current relationships. High uncertainty 
avoidance societies are reluctant to change current status quo including relationships. In contrast, 
low uncertainty avoidance societies are willing to risk cutting them. Thus, it’s more probable to 
establish trust by the intentionality process in high uncertainty avoidance cultures compared to 
low ones. 
• Capability process: People are different significantly in their competence, ability, or expertise. In 
a capability process, trustees’ trustworthiness is determined by whether trustees’ ability meets 
their obligations as well as the trustors’ expectations. Contrast to individualist and masculine 
societies, in collectivist societies, people work together to achieve common goals and evaluate 
the performance based on group achievement. Similarly, feminine societies give less 
acknowledgement to individual achievement. In other words, it’s more likely to form trust by the 
capability process in individualist and masculine cultures. In terms of power distance dimension, 
low power distance societies have equal view of others regarding abilities and expertise while 
high power distance societies emphasize on the difference between experts and nonexperts. 
Therefore, it’s more likely to form trust by the capability process in high power distance cultures 
compared to the low ones. In uncertainty avoidance dimension, people in high uncertainty 
avoidance societies try to mitigate uncertainty and expertise is highly regarded as an ability to 
help change trustor’s uncertainty to certainty. In this regard, trustors in high uncertainty avoidance 
cultures are more likely to develop trust by the capability process than ones in low uncertainty 
 8 
avoidance cultures. 
• Transference process: Trust is transferred from a trusted “proof source” to another party, which 
the trustors have little or no direct experience. For example, certified doctors may be trusted 
because they are certified by a trusted institution. The transference process is active when faith in 
people and institutions is high. Because individualist culture doesn’t have a close social bond, it 
makes difficult to transfer trust to people. Also, masculine culture emphasizes on independence 
of individuals, so people are reluctant to rely on others. In other words, collectivist and feminine 
cultures are more likely to develop trust by a transference process. As the transference process is 
associated with faith in others, in power distance dimension, the low power distance societies are 
more likely to form trust by the transference process because people in these societies have high 
faith in others. As explained above, uncertainty avoidance dimension is the degree to which 
people desire to maintain existing relationships. High uncertainty avoidance societies are highly 
motivated to keep stable relationships and see others similar to them. This addresses that high 
uncertainty avoidance cultures are more likely to form trust by the transference process compared 
to low uncertainty avoidance cultures.  
Table 1. Summarized version of Conceptual Domains, Cultural Taxonomies, and the Influence of 
Societal Norms and Values on the Formation of Trust (Doney et el., 1998) 
Hofstede’s (1980) 
cultural dimensions 
Influence on trust building process 
Calculative 
process 
Prediction 
process 
Intentionality 
process 
Capability 
process 
Transference 
process 
High power 
distance + +  +  
Low power distance   +  + 
Individualism +   +  
Collectivism  + +  + 
Masculinity +   +  
Femininity  + +  + 
High uncertainty 
avoidance  + + + + 
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Low uncertainty 
avoidance +     
 
Section 3. HOFSTEDE’S (1980) NATIONAL CULTURAL DIMENSION AND FIVE 
COGNITIVE PROCESSES IN THE CASES OF JAPAN AND SOUTH KOREA 
Before examining how national culture of Japan and South Korea influence the trust building 
process from the cases of four acquisitions, I will explain the national culture characteristics of Japan 
and South Korea by Hofstede’ cultural dimensions referring to Country Comparison Tool in Hofstede 
insights. Referring to Figure 2, there are similarities and discrepancies in the national cultural 
dimension between two countries. First of all, power distance index scores of Japan and South Korea 
are over but close to 50. This means that two countries belong to high power distance cultures but 
more likely moderately. For example, Japanese corporate organizations are hierarchical, but their 
decision-making processes are slow. Because they don’t make decisions by one top guy who makes 
all the important decisions in other high power distance countries. Second, in the comparison of 
individualism, Japan and South Korea are collective societies. Interestingly, Japan is more 
individualistic and close to 50. Unlike other neighboring countries such as South Korea and China, 
one of the explanations of this characteristics is that Japanese society doesn’t have extended family 
system. In terms of masculinity, you will see the biggest gap between two countries. Japan is a 
masculine society where competition is high among individuals and individuals’ achievements are 
well regarded, on the other hand, South Korea is a collective society where cooperation for group’s 
goal is important. Last, the scores of uncertainty avoidance index tell us that both countries are high 
uncertainty avoidance societies. In these societies, people make precise norms and expect everyone to 
follow the norms, but innovation may be difficult to happen. Security is important in individual 
motivation. 
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Figure 2. Comparison of National Culture between Japan and South Korea (Hofstede Insights) 
 
Based on the comparison above, I applied these characteristics to the five cognitive trust 
building processes, the model of Doney et el. (1998) as mentioned above (Table 1), to understand and 
observe how these processes worked in the four acquisition cases in the next chapter. As you can see 
Table 2 below, I put a plus sign in each box in accordance with relations between the national cultural 
dimensions and the five cognitive trust building processes suggested by the model. The only difference 
is masculinity. Each number represents the degree to which each process is important in terms of trust 
building. For instance, Japanese society highly regards trustee’s predictable behaviors and competency 
and ability. It doesn’t mean that the other three are not important but more likely to be less important. 
In the case of South Korea, it’s notable that the most important process is prediction, and intentionality 
and transference are followed as the second importance. Then, how will these processes work in the 
real world? what practices/trustees’ behaviors will influence these processes? Does the level of 
importance of each process have a significant role in the development of trust? Are there any 
similarities or differences of influencing factors between two countries? I will answer these questions 
in the following chapters. 
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Table 2. Five Cognitive Trust Building Processes in Japanese and South Korean National Cultures 
Country Cultural dimensions 
Influence on Trust building process 
Calculative 
process 
Prediction 
process 
Intentionality 
process 
Capability 
process 
Transference 
process 
Japan 
High power 
distance + +  +  
Collectivism  + +  + 
Masculinity +   +  
High 
uncertainty 
avoidance 
 + + + + 
Total 2 3 2 3 2 
South 
Korea 
High power 
distance + +  +  
Collectivism  + +  + 
Femininity  + +  + 
High 
uncertainty 
avoidance 
 + + + + 
Total 1 4 3 2 3 
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CHAPTER 3. RESEARCH METHDOLOGY 
To answer the first two questions from the previous chapter, 1) how the trust is developed 
through the five cognitive trust building processes in the real world and 2) what factors influence the 
processes, I will explain four transactions of cross-border acquisitions, Mitsubishi 
Motor/DaimlerChrysler, Nissan Motor/Renault, Ssangyong Motor/Shanghai Automotive Industry 
Corporation (SAIC) and Daewoo commercial/Tata Motor (Table 3.), and then explain each process of 
post-acquisition integration. Thereafter, I will analyze the post-acquisition integration processes to 
find out what trustees’ behaviors/implementation would influence the trustors’ trust development 
through the five cognitive trust building processes. In the cases, trustors are Japanese and Korean 
employees from acquired companies and trustees are top management from foreign acquiring 
companies. Furthermore, I chose two cases by each country, which consist of success and failure. I 
defined the success and failure by evaluations generally accepted among the public including 
researchers and media. The cases were collected based on the secondary sources, including business 
school cases, research papers and news reports (Gill, 2012; Froese & Goeritz, 2007; Zhang & Stening, 
2013; Leiping & White, 2011, 2012; Kotosaka & Yamazaki, 2014; Singh & Singh, 2008). 
 
Table 3. Summary of Four Acquisition Cases 
Month/Year Acquiring companies 
Acquired 
companies 
The stakes of 
purchase 
Integration 
results 
March/2000 DaimlerChrysler (Germany-US) 
Mitsubishi Motor 
(Japan) 
34%  
(USD 2.1 billion) Failure 
March/1999 Renault (France) 
Nissan Motor 
(Japan) 
36.8%  
(USD 5.4 billion) Success 
October/2004 
Shanghai 
Automotive 
Industry 
Corporation 
(China) 
Ssangyong 
Motor 
(South Korea) 
48.9%  
(USD 572 million) Failure 
March/2004 Tata Motor (India) 
Daewoo 
Commercial 
(South Korea) 
100%  
(USD 102 million) Success 
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CHAPTER 4. CASE STUDIES ANALYSIS: POST-ACQUISITION 
INTEGRATION IN AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY 
Section 1. MITSUBISHI MOTOR AND DAIMLERCHRYSLER 
4.1.1. Overview 
In 1998, a German car maker, Daimler Benz merged with American Chrysler to make a 
transcontinental automobile company with a vision ‘Welt AG (World company)’. To achieve the vision, 
the merged company tried to find a partner in Asia. After Honda Motor and Nissan Motor rejected 
their offers, DaimlerChrysler decided to partner with Mitsubishi Motor (“Mitsubishi”), the last 
Japanese automobile company searching for an international partner. DaimlerChrysler expected access 
to Asian market and create synergy in the subcompact car and small-size truck markets.  Mitsubishi 
has been struggling with multiple problems such as declining market share, losing profit and increasing 
debt. And, even worse, they had launched only one car in 2000. Consequently, Mitsubishi decided to 
sell a third of its share to obtain lacking cash. In March 2000, DaimlerChrysler announced to buy a 
controlling 34% stake in Mitsubishi for $2.1 billion (CNN Money). But, in the same year later, 
Mitsubishi’s covered scandals about defect parts were uncovered, which makes DaimlerChrysler 
renegotiated the price to $1.9 billion (BBC News). In 2001, DaimlerChrysler acquired additional 3.3% 
stake of Mitsubishi from Volvo and had a 37.3% stake finally. Though both companies called this as a 
strategic alliance, it seemed more like an acquisition because a shareholder with a more than 33 % 
stake can control a company under the Japanese Corporate Law (Froese, F.J., & Goeritz, L.E, 2007). 
Affected by a risky car loan program in the US in 2003, Mitsubishi recorded a net loss $2.0 billion in 
2004. In April 2004, shareholders of Mitsubishi had asked to inject capital to save the company, but 
DaimlerChrysler refused further investment. In consequence, Rolf Eckrodt, a dispatched CEO from 
DaimlerChrysler, stepped down. Mitsubishi received capital injections in June 2004 and January 2005, 
which resulted dilution of DaimlerChrysler’s stake to 12.4%. In November 2005, DaimlerChrysler 
sold the remaining stake at $1.1 billion and Mitsubishi returned to its Keiretsu. 
 14 
4.1.2. Post-acquisition integration 
In July 2000, DaimlerChrysler sent a team of managers, led by Rolf Eckrodt, to turnaround 
Mitsubishi. Before coming to Japan, Rolf Eckrod had two corporate turnaround experiences as 
President of Mercedes-Benz do Brasil, a producer of trucks and buses, and President and Executive 
Office of Adtranz, the rail system unit of DaimlerChrysler group (Profile of Rolf Eckrodt). He became 
Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer in January 2001, and after one and half years, 
he became President and Chief Executive Officer of Mitsubishi. Even though, he was well respected, 
he and the managers from Germany couldn’t earn the full support of the Mitsubishi employees. In the 
beginning of the turnaround, several small cross-company teams were formed to find solutions for 
Mitsubishi, however, it was unclear who is going to take charge of the executions of the findings. Even 
the Mitsubishi employees were willing to learn from and cooperate with DaimlerChrysler, the 
DaimlerChrysler managers treated the Mitsubishi employees as junior partners, and the managers were 
perceived as temporary guests who behave opportunistically and were less committed. Also, 
DaimlerChrysler didn’t make enough effort to create good flows of communication and collaboration 
between divisions. Only the heads of division communicated with each other and most time they 
reported directly to the CEO. On top of that, ‘a target-specific information’ policy of DaimlerChrysler 
hampered the communication. This means that the access to important information was only allowed 
to top management. Furthermore, all Japanese top-level management were excluded from top 
management decisions. Therefore, most of the Mitsubishi employees didn’t know what was happening 
in the company. When Rolf Eckrodt became a CEO, after 2 years of the dispatch from Germany, he 
put joint decision-making in importance and established cross-functional teams. However, it didn’t go 
well as he planned due to imminent profitability pressure and short-term results. Some projects were 
not finished, and others were cancelled even though they were ready to execute the plans. To facilitate 
participation, two companies set up the several meetings, but the meetings were perceived as 
inefficiency by the Mitsubishi managers due to a large number of participants. Eventually, the 
meetings made the managers irritated and this resulted with less information sharing with their 
subordinates. Lastly, Rolf Eckrodt’s leadership was in question. “One manager noted that Eckrodt was 
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‘too soft’ and sought consensus with the Mitsubishi managers instead of striving for more ambitions 
and sometimes painful cost-cutting measures” (Froese, F.J., & Goeritz, L.E, 2007). In addition to this, 
he and his team was criticized not having a clear direction and well-defined goals. Unfortunately, there 
were external circumstances which influenced his authority negatively in doing turnaround the 
Mitsubishi. For instance, Rolf Eckrodt didn’t have a direct reporting line to the DaimlerChrysler’s 
CEO, which made him hard to get solid support from headquarter.  
4.1.3. Five cognitive trust building processes analysis 
Firstly, in a calculative process, the Mitsubishi employees may see the amount of investment 
for the 37.3% stake DaimlerChrysler paid as cost if DaimlerChrysler failed to turnaround Mitsubishi 
and to create the synergies. Secondly, DaimlerChrysler doesn’t seem to be careful about establishing 
communication channels and information sharing systems with the employees in Mitsubishi. The 
decision that no single Japanese executive was included in top management decisions and having ‘a 
target-specific information’ policy caused disconnection between the top management and the 
employees in Mitsubishi. Also, there was only limited exchanges between heads of divisions, even 
worse, the heads reported only to CEO mostly. There is no doubt why Mitsubishi employees had no 
idea what is going on in the organization. Furthermore, top management canceled the cross functional 
projects when there was high profit pressure. This may leave questions about the future plans of the 
top management to the Mitsubishi employees because the projects were expected to implement, but 
later they were turned down suddenly. In a prediction process, trustors can hardly form trust when 
trustees’ behaviors are unpredictable. In this sense, the Mitsubishi employees may have high doubt 
about the top management’s behaviors. Thirdly, in an intentionality process, to develop trust, trustees 
need to show good intention and motivation that trustees’ behaviors are benevolent to trustors. In 
regard to the turnaround plan implementation, DaimlerChrysler relied mainly on their team to execute 
and Japanese executives couldn’t involve in top management decisions. This would be interpreted 
badly by the Mitsubishi employees because there was no one who can represent their interests. 
Moreover, the Mitsubishi employees were treated as juniors not equal partners by the DaimlerChrysler’ 
managers, which the Mitsubishi employees may feel disrespected. Also, the Mitsubishi employees saw 
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the German managers as temporary guests who were less committed and acting opportunistically, 
which helps forming the perception that the German managers acted against the interests of Mitsubishi. 
Lastly, in a capability process, it’s more likely to form trust if the Mitsubishi employees perceived the 
top management as capable and competent leaders to turnaround the company. Although Rolf Eckrodt 
succeed to turnaround two companies in his previous works, his lack of clear and well-defined goals 
and too soft leadership were criticized by the Mitsubishi employees. And the failure of cross functional 
projects and insufficient formal meetings gave disappointment and irritation to the Mitsubishi 
managers. Furthermore, Rolf Eckrodt didn’t have a direct reporting line to a CEO of headquarter which 
may implicate his weak position in the group of DaimlerChrysler. Based on the assessment above, it’s 
highly likely that the employees in Mitsubishi evaluated Rolf Eckrodt incapable to lead Mitsubishi by 
a capability process.  
Section 2. NISSAN MOTOR AND RENAULT 
4.2.1. Overview 
In the early 1990s, the economic bubble burst. Nissan Motor (“Nissan”), a Japanese carmaker, 
became suffered due to its massive borrowing for previous aggressive expansion plan. Its domestic 
market share declined from 19% in 1988 to 13% in 1998 and the global market share decreased from 
6.6% in 1991 to 4.9% in 1998. The net automotive debts reached 2.1 trillion yen in 1998. While Toyota 
Motor and Honda Motor, its competitors, were never in red from 1990 to 1998, Nissan recorded 
consecutive losses for all but one year. The company continuously tried to restructure its organization, 
but the attempts resulted with all failure. Nissan needed to find an alliance partner to help them to 
turnaround. Renault, a French carmaker, looked for a new opportunity outside Europe to sustain the 
growth and survive in the integrated global auto industry. Renault found Nissan as an attractive partner 
in Asia because of Nissan’s global presence in the US, Asia and Europe and high-quality technologies. 
Also, Renault’s top management thought Renault contribute to restructuring of Nissan from their own 
restructuring experiences. On March 27, 1999, Nissan-Renault alliance was signed by two companies. 
Renault injected 643 billion yen ($5.4 billion) for a 36.8% share of Nissan, with an option to increase 
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the ratio up to 44.4%. Like the case of Mitsubishi-DaimlerChrysler’ strategic alliance, the Nissan-
Renault alliance seemed more like an acquisition because a shareholder with a more than 33 % stake 
can control a company under the Japanese Corporate Law (Froese, F.J., & Goeritz, L.E, 2007). Nissan 
elected a new COO in June 1999, Carlos Ghosn who later became a CEO in June 2001. As soon as he 
arrived in Nissan, he announced to develop the “Nissan Revival Plan” for fiscal years from 2000 to 
2002 and the final version was announced in October. After implementing the plan, Nissan turned in 
black in fiscal year 2000 and achieved 11% operating margin in fiscal year 2001 from 1% in fiscal 
year 1999. The goals of the plan were achieved a year earlier than the original schedule in March 2002. 
Nissan again announced their second plan which is called “Nissan 180”, mid-term plan for fiscal year 
from 2002 to 2004. After completing the two plans successfully, Nissan truly became on track for 
profitable growth. Operating margin increased to 10% in fiscal year 2004 and global sales volume 
reached 3 million in fiscal year 2003. With the remarkable record in Nissan, Carlos Ghosn became the 
CEO of Renault in June 2005 along with the one of Nissan. 
4.2.2. Post-acquisition integration 
Before the integration team was dispatched from France officially, Carlos Ghosn, who was 
appointed as COO three months later and led the Renault managers, arranged the one-on-one meetings 
with 600 Nissan employees, dealers and customers. The reasons behind his movement are not only to 
gather and enrich solutions for Nissan’s revival but also to make people be part of the solutions. In 
June 1999, Ghosn was elected as COO and the board of directors were decreased from 43 to 9 at the 
general shareholders’ meeting. The newly elected 9 members, 3 from Renault and 6 from Nissan, 
formed Executive committee which was the decision-making body of Nissan. The selection of 
members from Nissan was left entirely to Nissan. When Ghosn decided the managers from Renault, 
he selected purely based on their capability and willingness to work for Nissan. Also, he sent back 
anyone who acted without respect to the Nissan employees to Renault. On July 7, 1999, Ghosn 
explained nine areas for progress based on his assessment from the previous tour in Nissan and 
announced a plan to form nine Cross-Functional Teams (CFTs) and their leaders. At the same time, he 
encouraged everyone to suggest and propose the plans directly to him or the Executive committee. 
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The CFTs aimed to make proposals to Ghosn and the Executive committee. The proposals covered 
issues of business development, cost reduction, organization and decision-making process. Each team 
was under the supervision of two members of the Executive committee, who are called as “Leaders” 
and nine middle-levels managers were selected as “Pilots” by the team leaders. To encourage and 
motivate the pilots, Ghosn personally invited the nine pilots to dinner and surprised them by showing 
his expectation and interest in their capacity. Also, he was in close contact with the pilots and made 
his chief of staff attend many meetings to encourage and provide advice as needed. The leaders also 
played as mediators between the management and the pilots. For three months of the preparation, 200 
employees took a part in the CFTs and many more staff were interviewed by the teams or contributed 
to the teams’ initiatives. On October 18, 1999, the Nissan Revival Plan (NRP), a mid-term plan for FY 
2000 to FY 2002, was announced. Ghosn and the executives promised to resign if they failed to achieve 
their commitments in the NRP. Soon after the announcement, Ghosn emphasized on the execution of 
the NRP as his first priority. To facilitate the process, firstly, he was clear about the responsibility and 
authority of each member of management and delegated managers to make decisions within the 
defined scope. Also, he introduced Program Directors (PD) from Renault, which six major car 
categories will be responsible for operating profit, so that the directors are more actively to work cross-
functionally with all related functions. In the process of changing mindset of the people in Nissan, he 
brought the fact/number-based proposals and made efforts to persuade them continuously. To avoid 
confusion and doubts from inside and outside Nissan, Ghosn frequently communicated the Nissan’s 
current situations with various media and carefully delivered the messages to avoid misinterpretation. 
As one of the Nissan employees, Ghosn also showed his commitment by working hard unlike 
traditional Japanese executives. He got a nickname of “Seven-eleven” as he came to the office early 
in the morning and left in the late night.  
4.2.3. Five cognitive trust building processes analysis 
In a calculative process, trustors evaluate the rewards and costs trustees gain or pay when the 
trustees behave for self-interest. Renault injected 643 billion yen to acquire a 36.8% share of Nissan. 
This amount includes the value of Nissan and synergies that two firms will create. If Renault failed to 
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capture the values from the revival of Nissan, the amount they invested will be considered as cost. 
Also, when new management of Nissan promised to step down from their seats if the NRP failed to 
meet its commitments, this implicates that losing their jobs will be regarded as cost. In a prediction 
process, when trustees’ behaviors are more predictable, trustors are more likely to think trustees are 
trustworthy. In terms of this process, it seems like the top management had done quite a lot of 
initiatives. First of all, the top management made the employees of Nissan participate in making 
decisions and developing and implementing the revival plans. The nine members of board of directors 
formed the Executive Committee which was an important decision making body. This allowed two 
firms to exchange the ideas and communicate important issues together. When CFTs prepared for their 
proposals of the NRP, 200 employees in Nissan participated and many more employees were 
interviewed. Also, adopting PDs gave higher authority and responsibility to the employees in Nissan, 
which also facilitated to work coherently with other functions. By involving in the project and 
cooperating more with others, Nissan employees would learn better about what the top management 
aimed and planned for the company and predict what will happen to the company in the future. In 
addition, Ghosn’s open and frequent communication inside and outside would be helpful to give a 
clear direction to the Nissan employees where they were heading to. In an intentionality process, 
trustors evaluate trustees’ behaviors to know if the intention and motivation of the trustees are 
benevolent. Ghosn’s behaviors would be effective in this process. For example, before coming to 
Japan as COO, he arranged one-on-one meetings with 600 employees in Nissan to find the solutions 
and he promised to resign if the NRP’s commitments were not met. These would show his strong 
commitments to revive Nissan to the employees in Nissan. Also, his personal touch with the pilots of 
CFTs would deliver his benevolent motives toward Nissan. Together with his behaviors, Renault also 
tried to show his approach to Nissan by bringing the managers who are willing to work for Nissan. In 
a capability process, the top management’s ability to revive Nissan would be influential to form trust 
of the Nissan employees. Ghosn’s successful turnaround history and hard-working style would be seen 
as his competency to save Nissan. Furthermore, his fact-based discussion and using logic with 
numbers would be interpreted as his good understanding of the business and good negotiation skills.   
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Section 3. SSANGYONG MOTOR AND SHANGHAI AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY 
CORPORATION 
4.3.1. Overview 
When Asian financial crisis hit the market in July 1997, Ssangyong Motor (“Ssangyong”), a 
Korean carmaker specialized in producing 4WD passenger cars, was forced to transfer 53.5% of its 
share to Daewoo Group which took KRW 2 trillion debt of Ssangyong. After 2 years later, Daewoo 
Group went bankrupt and Ssangyong was spun off. Ssangyong’s creditors planned to turnaround the 
company and a 3-year workout program was announced in 2001. The program was led by a well-
respected CEO, Jin-kwan So who worked for Ssangyong for 30 years. Thanks to the restructuring 
efforts, Ssangyong achieved net profit of USD 500 million along with sales of USD 2.8 billion and 
captured 12.5% of domestic market in 2003. After the successful turnaround, the creditors decided to 
sell the company. Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation (“SAIC”), one of China’s big three state-
owned car manufacturers, became a large conglomerate through JVs with Volkswagen(“VW”) and 
General Motors (“GM”). Though SAIC acquired technologies in assembly and manufacturing, the 
company wasn’t able to design and develop complete vehicles. By following Chinese government’s 
vision to make SAIC one of the largest global auto manufacturers by 2020, SAIC decided to acquire 
global resource to develop its own brand. On October 28, 2004, SAIC and Ssangyong’s creditors group 
signed on a contract to transfer 48.9% of Ssangyong’s share to SAIC for USD 572 million including 
special agreement negotiated with Ssangyong’s union labor which demanded employment security, 
long-term investment commitment, and independent operation of Ssangyong. The Korean media 
largely reported that SAIC planned to invest USD 1 billion in Ssanyong to increase production 
capacity and develop new models. On March 2, 2005, a 100-day integration plan was announced 
combining ideas from two sides. By June 2006, SAIC had bought additional 2% of Ssangyong’s share 
from open market and reached 50.91% share. In October 2005, management announced the S-100 
project to establish a JV between Ssangyong and SAIC in China to produce new Ssangyong cars. 
However, in March 2006, China’s National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) ruled 
against SAIC’s S-100 project. This rule triggered SAIC to focus more on transfer of Ssangyong’s 
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technology and R&D capabilities. On July 10, 2006, SAIC notified the Ssangyong labor union of the 
lay-off plan for 19% of total employees and this resulted with 43 days of union strike. On August 30, 
2006, the union action was ended after SAIC cancelled the lay-off plan and promised the investment 
USD 300 million annually through 2009. In 2007, management uncovered a long-term growth plan 
for Ssangyong and its net profit became positive. However, together with increasing diesel and gas 
prices and heavy dependence on diesel vehicles, Ssangyong’s domestic sales dropped 68% and exports 
decreased 17% year-on-year. Ssangyong requested SAIC to provide emergency cash, but SAIC 
refused the request due to union’s demand that all Chinese executive step down and their refusal about 
the restructuring plan. SAIC also approached Korean Development Bank (“KDB”) to gain financial 
support, but the KDB refused additional fund unless SAIC invests. On January 9, 2009, Ssangyong 
filed for court receivership to restructure the company and SAIC started to divest from April 2010 by 
selling the share in the open market.  
4.3.2. Post-acquisition integration 
After the ownership was transferred to SAIC officially in January 2005, SAIC selected Zhiwei 
Jiang as co-CEO of Ssangyong along with existing CEO, Jin-kwan So. Jiang had worked for SAIC 
since 1970 and had involved in the two major JVs with VW and GM. As a vice president of SAIC, he 
was the representative of SAIC in the negotiations with Ssangyong’s creditors. SAIC also 
implemented cultural integration by training Chinese managers to understand Korean culture and 
providing a special fund for giving gifts, a part of Korean business culture. Also, they invited the 
Ssangyong employees to its headquarters in China. The employees in Ssangyong also made effort to 
understand Chinese culture. Including Jin-kwan So, 30 senior executives studied Chinese and they 
became to communicate with their Chinese managers. Despite the changes brought by SAIC, the 
Ssangyong employees didn’t seem to worry about the change because they had a promise of 100% 
employment security from SAIC. After announcing the first integration plan on March 2, 2005, SAIC 
sent Jiang and five Chinese expats who were appointed to top management position to South Korea 
on March 15 to take stronger control. Also, SAIC appointed Hong Chen, a president of SAIC, and 
Haitao Zhang, one of five expats, as members of board of directors on March 25. This resulted with 
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that three out of four directors were from SAIC. The employees in Ssangyong weren’t happy with 
those personnel changes because they considered the SAIC’s managers are too young and 
inexperienced compared to the Korean senior executives. In general, the Chinese executives lacked 
experiences in international and corporate-level management. Unfortunately, the diesel price increase 
and Korean won appreciation started to hurt the Ssangyong performance. As a result, SAIC decided 
to improve cost structure, but the Ssangyong labor union criticized the decision by saying that SAIC 
isn’t fulfilling the promise about the investment in Ssangyong and SAIC instead seek the way to reduce 
the cost. While dealing with the challenges externally and internally, the board dismissed Jin-kwan So 
from his position due to his disturbance in the process of integration and appointed Hyung-tak Choi, 
chief of product development, as president. This shook the Ssangyong employees including Choi 
himself because there were more than six senior executives above him. The labor union saw the 
dismissal of Jin-Kwan So as a sign of lay-offs and technology transfer to China. Soon, the 
representatives of union made a secret trip to China to meet Maoyuan Hu, chairman of SAIC, and 
obtained assurance from him that SAIC will invest USD 1 billion in Ssangyong. Followed by So’s 
dismissal, additional eight senior Korean executives were dismissed. After the S-100 project was 
rejected by the NDRC in March 2006, SAIC revised the plan and signed the L-Project with Choi and 
Ssangyong. Because this agreement allowed SAIC to access to the all technologies in Ssangyong 
developed model in China, the labor union angered about that SAIC only pay USD 24 million despite 
the R&D expense to develop the model was USD 300 million. Moreover, South Korea’s Civil 
Collective Speculative Agency concluded that SAIC was attempting to transfer the technology, value 
of USD 200 million, to China at USD 24 million. In July 2006, SAIC announced a plan to lay off 19% 
of total employees in Ssangyong. After experiencing hard resistance from the union, SAIC dropped 
their plan and promised USD 300 million investment annually to 2009, which is consistent with the 
promise Maoyuan Hu made. From the series of devasting events, more and more the employees in 
Ssangyong started to question about the future of the company.  
4.3.3. Five cognitive trust building processes analysis 
SAIC paid more than USD 572 million to acquire majority share of Ssangyong. In a calculative 
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process, trustors compare the cost trustees pay to the reward trustees get when trustees put their 
interests prior to the interests of trustors. If the cost is higher than the reward, the trust is more likely 
to be formed by trustors. In the SAIC case, the Ssangyong employees would consider the invested 
amount by SAIC as the cost if SAIC failed to gain their trust. In a prediction process, the more 
predictable the trustee’s behaviors are, trust is more likely to be formed. The Sssanyong’s labor union 
obtained the special agreement from SAIC when the transaction agreement was made. This special 
agreement guaranteed the total employment security and long-term investment in Ssangyong, which 
are critical to gain sustainable growth of Ssangyong. However, the top management from SAIC broke 
the promise by announcing the lay-off plan and delaying the investment. This would cause a large 
doubt about the management’s behaviors which were highly difficult to predict. To increase the 
predictability, the labor union visited in SAIC in China for getting the assurance of Maoyuan Hu, the 
president of SAIC, but the predictability was never improved as there was no change made thereafter. 
Also, the access to the important information was very limited to the Ssangyong employees as there 
was only one executive in top management and board of directors. Thus, it’s understandable why the 
employees in Ssangyong depended so much on the promise that was made in the deal, not on the 
unofficial tools such as an internal decision-making system. In terms of intentionality, the SAIC’s 
management had performed quite poorly although there were some efforts to build cultural 
understanding by learning Korean culture and inviting the employees to China. After announcing the 
S-100 project, the Korean employees interpreted the project as a tool of technology transfer and a path 
to losing jobs. Moreover, when the NDRC rejected the project, rushing to transfer the technology by 
the L-project seemed to confirm the interpretation and suspicion that the Ssangyong’s employees had. 
Another example is the appointment of five Chinese to top management as soon as the deal was 
completed. Becuase Ssangyong had been successful to turnaround the company, the existing managers 
in Ssangyong were well respected in the company. The drastic change in top management and taking 
out the Korean representatives would be a threat to the Ssangyong employees. In a capability process, 
the trust is more likely to be formed if trustees regard trustors’ capability meets the trustors’ 
expectations. The Korean employees thought their Chinese management were not capable to run the 
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company due to lack of experiences in international and corporate-level management along with 
relatively young ages compared to the Korean senior executives. In the perspective of a transference 
process, trust is transferred from a trusted proof source to another party, which the trustors have little 
or no direct experience. After knowing that SAIC and Ssangyong signed on the L-Project, the labor 
union argued that SAIC tried to transfer the technology with a very low price. Later, this allegation 
was confirmed by South Korea’s Civil Collective Speculative Capital Surveillance Agency’s 
conclusion. As a result, this confirmation would influence negatively forming the trust. 
Section 4. DAEWOO COMMERCIAL AND TATA MOTORS 
4.4.1. Overview 
Tata Motors (“Tata”), the largest manufacturer of medium and heavy commercial vehicles in 
India, was looking for a new partner to meet increasing customer demand and global standard, which 
was driven by launching “World Truck” program. Although Tata had internal technology to develop 
its own trucks, with engines of up to 210 horsepower, Tata sold its vehicles mainly in domestic market 
with only five percent in foreign sales in 2003. Daewoo Motor, the second largest automobile and 
truck manufacturers by the mid-1990s in South Korea, had good technologies for manufacturing high-
end trucks with engines in the 210 to 400 horsepower. With the bankruptcy of Daewoo group after 
Asian Financial crisis in 1997, Daewoo Motor went bankrupt in November 2000. The car operations 
were sold to GM in November 2002 and the bus operations were sold to a Korean firm. The only 
remaining truck operations, Daewoo Commercial Vehicle Company (“DCVC”), sustained their 
presence in the market with sales of about 4,000 units a year thanks to local competitors’ exit the 
industry after the financial crisis. In 2003, DCVC seemed to recover from the crisis and became the 
second largest market player with 26 percent market share in South Korea. However, DCVC’s models 
were dated due to a lack of investment since the crisis. To introduce a new product line, the company 
needed investment from outside. After being selected as one of 10 firms, Tata conducted a due 
diligence by its own team instead using M&A consultants. During the due diligence, the team found 
out the preference of DCVC to be acquired by a European company which had advanced technology 
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and strong finance that DCVC needed. This finding also led the team to realize the acquisition isn’t 
going to work unless DCVC accepted Tata as an owner. Soon, the team initiated a program to educate 
the Korean company about Tata. The key was to have good communications with Koreans, so Tata 
translated its bid and company material into Korean and made presentations in Korean for the DCVC 
employees and stakeholders. To understand more about Korean operations as a foreign buyer, Tata 
visited other Korean companies acquired by foreign buyers and gain confidence on Koreans’ work 
ethics and passion. Later, this view convinced the Tata team to agree on no lay-off in the first three 
years after the acquisition. With the strong communications efforts, Tata was able to gain support from 
DCVC. In February 2004, Tata acquired DCVC at USD 102 million (own funds; 50%, loans against 
DCVC assets; 50%) for 100% stake and changed the name of DCVC to Tata Daewoo Commercial 
Vehicle (TDCV). By having support of Tata, TDCV launched new medium trucks in a decade and 
increased market share to about 30 percent in 2005. From 2004 to 2005, the sales and the export units 
were increased by 31% and 112% respectively. Also, the poor sales and service of TDCV had been 
improved by doubling the number of service outlets in Korea. In early 2006, despite that TDCV could 
repay the loan from the acquisition in full, the top management of TDCV decided to repay the half of 
the loan and invest USD 10 million for future production expansion in Gunsan.  
4.4.2. Post-acquisition integration 
As a first step, Kwang-Ok Chae was appointed as president and CEO. Mr. Chae had been in 
the Daewoo group throughout his entire career and served as a bankruptcy court-appointed CEO in 
DCVC. Ravi Kant, Tata Motor’s chairman/executive director and the leader of the negotiation team, 
selected a team of nine managers to execute the integration. The integration plans were developed by 
the managers and detailed in 30-day, 60-day, 90-day and one-year plans. The policies of the integration 
were 1) TDCV is a Korean firm, but shareholding is Indian and 2) deep involvement is avoided and 
the integration will be gradually implemented. The new top management consisted of one president, 
Mr. Chae, two vice presidents from Tata and two most senior TDCV general managers. Mr. Chae and 
the two Indian vice presidents were of the same age and the oldest in TDCV. This executive 
management team made all policy decisions, but the major issues were handled by the team leaders 
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“Team jangs”, which had been existing in the DCVC structure. The 20 Team jangs played an important 
role to communicate with the TDVC’s employees. To ensure the TDCV’s nationality as a Korean firm, 
Tata sent back six of the nine integration team members to India after finishing their tasks. To reinforce 
the integration, Tata introduced its three key requirements to comply as a member of Tata group such 
as the Tata Code of Conduct. Also, Tata brought SAP’s Enterprise Management Software systems into 
TDCV for common information and management platform. For the performance management, Tata 
introduced its “balanced scorecard”. These new introductions of systems were considered as 
implementing Tata’s superior systems. To facilitate communication, the Indian managers took Korean 
language classes and some of Korean managers made efforts to learn English. Also, important 
information sharing was conducted in Korean and English. On top of this, Tata tried to increase cultural 
affinity by holding Indian nights in Gunsan. To give confidence the TDCV employees in Tata, TDCV 
sent the union leaders to visit Tata’s plants in India. Compared to other labor unions from the 
competitors, TDCV achieved a wage negotiation without having a strike. For the effective integration 
in design, the product development teams in India and South Korea were integrated into one and the 
design work was divided in two countries based on expertise with allowing regular visits each other. 
To build transparency and fairness in R&D exchange, Tata verified the works done by TDCV and paid 
the prices for the works using external consultants.  
4.4.3. Five cognitive trust building processes analysis 
Tata had been very careful to plan the gaining trust from DCVC since the moment that they 
were not welcome by DCVC at the bidding process. It’s hard to evaluate the effect of trust building 
efforts Tata made before the transaction was completed, but it’s assumable that these efforts didn’t 
play negative roles on the process of trust development after the integration plan was implemented. 
First of all, in a calculative process, trustors evaluate the costs or rewards that trustees pay or gain if 
the trustees behave against trustors’ interests. If the trustors evaluate there are a lot more to pay than 
gain by the trustees, the trust building is more likely to develop. The financial commitments that Tata 
made can be interpreted as cost that Tata should pay if Tata failed to achieve the potential synergies 
from the deal. In this case, the payment of acquisition and investment in future expansion and IT 
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system will be considered as the cost. In a prediction process, trustors are more likely to develop trust 
when the trustors can predict trustees’ behaviors. The TDCV’s employees had a guarantee of job 
security in the next 3 years after the deal was finished. This provided the clarity about the new top 
management’s behavior in the near future in terms of organizational changes. Also, keeping the old 
“Team jangs” structure helped the employees of TDCV involving in the major issues, so the employees 
could know what was happening in the newly changed company. To overcome the language barrier 
which affects the quality of communication, all the important information and meetings were 
conducted in both English and Korean. This showed the access to information wasn’t restricted and 
the TDCV employees could know the important issues in the company. Also, the decision to invest in 
future expansion and systems gave a sense to the TDCV employees, which is what TDCV planned for 
their future. In an intentionality process, trust is more likely to be formed when trustees’ behaviors are 
considered benevolent to trustors. By adopting a new policy that the TDCV is a Korean firm, Tata put 
this policy into actions. For instance, Tata appointed Korean CEO and tried to minimize its 
involvement in the operations of TDCV by sending the Indian managers who completed their jobs in 
TDCV back to India. In addition to this, TDVC’s new management made efforts to foster cultural 
understandings by learning Korean languages and holding Indian nights, which can be interpreted as 
respect and openness to learn from each other. In a capability process, trustees need to prove their 
abilities that meet trustors’ expectations. DCVC had a highly hierarchical organizational structure, and 
therefore the serving years were considered equally to the level of experience and competency. To 
apply this culture, Tata sent two Indian vice presidents who were as old as the Korean president was, 
and the all three were the oldest in TDVC as well. As Tata was not known among the TDCV employees, 
it was crucial to prove that Tata is superior in some areas than TDCV and Tata can provide this 
superiority to help growing TDCV. To show Tata’s abilities, Tata invited the representatives of labor 
union to its much larger production site in India and introduced new IT and management systems to 
TDCV.  
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Table 4. Summary of Five Cognitive Trust Building Processes in the Four Cases 
 Calculative 
Process 
Prediction 
Process 
Intentionality 
Process 
Capability 
Process 
Transferenc
e Process 
Mitsubishi 
Motor and 
Daimler-
Chrysler 
 
(+) Price 
paid for the 
stake 
(-) No Japanese 
management 
(-) Lack of 
communication 
(-) Poor 
execution of the 
integration 
(-) Information 
sharing was 
restricted 
(-) High reliance 
on the 
DaimlerChrysle
r managers 
(-) Daimler 
Chrysler 
managers’ 
arrogant attitude 
and lack of 
commitment  
(-) No single 
Japanese 
management in 
top positions 
(+) Eckrodt’s 
Successful 
turnaround 
experience  
(-) Lacking 
clear and well-
defined goals 
(-) Too soft 
leadership 
(-) Lack of 
support from 
Germany 
(-) Poor 
execution of 
the integration 
 
Nissan 
Motor and 
Renault 
(+) Price 
paid for the 
stake 
(+) Personal 
commitment 
of top 
managemen
t 
(+) Build a 
supreme 
decision-
making body 
consisting of 
Nissan and 
Renault 
(+) 
Endorsement of 
proposals and 
implementation 
to CFTs and 
PDs 
(+) 
Transparency 
through 
communication
s 
(+) Ghosn’s 
one-on-on 
meetings with 
600 employees 
in Nissan 
(+) Personal 
commitment of 
top management 
(+) The Renault 
managers based 
on the 
capabilities and 
willingness to 
work for Nissan 
(+) Ghosn’s 
personal touch 
on the Nissan 
managers 
(+) Ghosn’s 
successful 
turnaround 
experiences 
(+) Ghosn’s 
hardworking 
style 
(+) Fact-based 
discussion and 
logic using 
numbers 
 
Ssangyong 
Motor and 
Shanghai 
Automotive 
Industry 
Corporatio
n 
 
(+) Price 
paid for the 
stake 
 
(+) A special 
agreement in no 
lay-off and 
long-term 
investment 
(+) Assurance 
by the SAIC’s 
president on 
(+) Fostering 
cultural 
understanding 
(+) Inviting the 
Ssangyong 
employees to its 
headquarter in 
China 
(-) Relatively 
young and 
inexperienced 
Chinese top 
management 
(-) South 
Korea 
government 
agency 
concluded 
on attempts 
to transfer 
the 
technology 
to China 
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investment 
(-) Breaking the 
special 
agreement 
(Lay-off and 
delaying the 
investment) 
(-) Unfulfilled 
the promise by 
the SAIC’s 
president 
(-) Only one 
executive in top 
management 
and board of 
directors 
(-) Projects in 
China with 
using the 
Ssangyong 
technology 
(-) Five Chinese 
appointed to top 
management 
positions 
(-) Dismissal of 
the respected 
CEO and senior 
executives 
with very 
low price 
Daewoo 
commercial 
and Tata 
Motors 
 
(+) Price 
paid for the 
stake 
(+) 
Additional 
investments 
(+) A guarantee 
of job security 
(+) Teamjang 
system 
continued 
(+) Information 
meetings 
conducted in 
both English 
and Korean 
(+) Additional 
investments 
(+) Integration 
policies; Korean 
firm, 
minimizing 
involvement by 
Tata 
(+) Fostering 
cultural 
understanding 
 
(+) Two 
Indian VPs 
were the 
oldest along 
with the 
Korean 
president 
(+) 
Introduction 
to new IT and 
management 
systems 
(+) Inviting 
representative
s of labor 
union to Tata 
in India 
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CHAPTER 5. ANALYSIS ON THE LEVEL OF IMPORTANCE OF 
FIVE COGNITIVE TRUST BUILDING PROCESSES AND KEY 
FINDINGS 
To answer my last two questions, 1) the role of the degree to which each process influences 
the development of trust and 2) similarities and differences in influencing factors between Japan and 
South Korea, I will use the summary of five cognitive trust building processes described in Table 4. 
As mentioned in Table 2, Japanese societies are more likely to be influenced by a prediction process 
and a capability process in the development of trust. On the other hand, Korean societies are most 
likely to be influenced by a prediction process in the trust building and more likely by an intentionality 
process and a transference process. Though I found that it’s hard to measure what degree to which 
each cognitive trust building process influence the development of trust, it’s observable that what 
changes were implemented by top management from acquiring companies, which are related to the 
five processes. For example, in the Japanese cases, it seems like that the top management made 
changes mostly in terms of a prediction, an intentionality and a capability processes and, in the Korean 
cases, the top management had implemented changes that are associated with a prediction and an 
intentionality processes mainly. Considering the importance of each cognitive process in each country, 
it’s interesting to see how the results of integration could be turned out in the four cases. For instance, 
the Ssangyong employees continued to fight with the top management from SAIC to protect their 
employment which was highly regarded as a sign of predictable future. In regard to the importance of 
a prediction process in the development of trust in South Korea, SAIC couldn’t be successful to gain 
trust from the employees in Ssangyong unless SAIC deliver the promise they made at the deal.     
On top of that, it’s also notable to see what specific influencing factors play in the development 
of trust in Japan and South Korea. In a calculative process, the financial commitment in the form of 
investment and top management’s personal commitment can be good factors to influence the process 
of trust building. Especially, the additional investment after paying the deal price would be a good way 
to show future commitment. In terms of a predictability process, it seems improving communication 
and sharing information are important to avoid uncertainty from the changes. Also, locating the enough 
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number of executives from acquired companies in top management positions would facilitate the 
information sharing to the bottom in the acquired companies. In addition to this, it’s notable to see that 
how the Korean employees demanded an agreement with the acquirers for protecting employment 
which can help giving stable future forecast in their organizational changes. Moreover, the Korean 
employees conflicted with the new management when the agreement was broken and tried to bring 
the agreement in place. In an intentionality process, the dominance of the acquirers in top management 
positions doesn’t seem to deliver a positive message to the employees in the acquired companies 
because there is little possibility that the interests of the employees will be represented and accepted 
in the course of decision making. Also, paying respect to the employees in the acquired companies 
seems important as benevolent behavior. Furthermore, it’s interesting to see that Ghosn tried to use 
his personal touch to the Japanese CFTs managers when he expressed his passion in Nissan while 
SAIC and Tata made efforts to express their benevolence by improving national cultural understanding. 
In a capability process, the employees in Nissan and Mitsubishi seemed to evaluate their new leaders 
by the integration performance. For example, Ghosn was considered as a strong and competent leader 
whereas Eckrodt was a weak and incompetent leader. However, the employees in Ssangyong thought 
their Chinese management was incompetent because their previous background was not enough to 
manage a global firm like Ssangyong. In the case of TDCV, Tata sensed the rigid seniority system in 
DCVC and sent two Indian vice presidents who were the oldest ones along with the Korean president. 
Also, it’s noticeable that the TDVC employees evaluated Tata as a firm which is demonstrating 
superior systems rather than evaluated the traits and performance of new top management. Relatively, 
a transference process wasn’t detected much in my analyses except for the case of Ssangyong and 
SAIC. In the case, a transference process didn’t seem to play a major role in the trust building process 
but more likely to reinforce another process such as an intentionality process. For instance, the 
Ssangyong employees had suspicion about the technology transfer to China by SAIC(Intentionality) 
and later this suspicion was confirmed by a third party (Transference).  
Table 5. The Influencing Factors on the Five Cognitive Trust Building Processes 
Country Cultural 
dimension 
Calculative 
process 
Prediction 
process 
Intentionality 
process 
Capability 
process 
Transferen
ce process 
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Japan The degree 
of 
importance 
on the trust 
building 
based on 
cultural 
dimensions 
2 3 2 3 2 
Influencing 
factors 
Financial 
commitmen
t 
Personal 
commitmen
t 
Number of 
Japanese 
executives 
in top 
managemen
t positions 
Communica
tion& 
Information 
access 
Endorsemen
t to 
subordinate
s 
Power 
balance in top 
management 
positions 
Commitment 
of managers 
from 
acquiring 
companies 
Personal 
touch and 
commitment 
by top 
management 
Successful 
turnaroun
d history 
of top 
manageme
nt 
Giving 
directions 
and 
leading 
the 
changes 
with 
strong 
leadership 
N/A 
South 
Korea  
The degree 
of 
importance 
on the trust 
building 
based on 
cultural 
dimensions 
1 4 3 2 3 
Influencing 
factors 
Financial 
commitmen
t 
Additional 
investment  
 
Employmen
t security 
Number of 
Korean 
executives 
in top 
managemen
t positions 
Continuing 
previous 
system 
Information 
sharing 
Improving 
cultural 
understanding 
Inviting the 
employees in 
acquired 
companies to 
HQs 
Power 
balance in top 
management 
positions 
Respect the 
identity of 
acquired 
companies 
Experienc
es based 
on 
seniority 
Introducti
on to the 
advanced 
systems 
Inviting 
the 
employees 
in 
acquired 
companies 
to HQs 
 
Proof by 
governme
ntal 
bodies 
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CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION 
To realize the value of the acquisition, successful integrations between the acquiring companies 
and the acquired companies are crucial through effective leadership. The performance of the effective 
leadership depends on the degree to which the employees in the acquired companies trust in top 
management from the acquiring companies. In the process of trust building, one of factors influences 
the process is propensity to trust of trustors. Throughout my research, I focused on the propensity to 
trust based on national culture and explained how national cultural differences influence five cognitive 
trust building processes. To be specific, applying the national culture dimensions of Japan and South 
Korea to the trust building processes, I observe how this relationship can play in the four post-
acquisition cases. After analyzing the cases, I found out what practices by top management would 
influence the trust building process with the employees in the acquired companies (Table 5). For the 
managers who work in the companies looking for future investment opportunities in Japan and South 
Korea, my research offers some insights in terms of nation-specific factors in the trust building process. 
In South Korea, employment security seems highly critical considering the employees put this on the 
deal agreement and fought to fix the problems when the agreement was broken. In the selection of 
new top management, Koreans tend to evaluate their new top management by seniority while Japanese 
tend to consider the actual performance of the top management in course of the integration execution. 
For the managers who seek opportunities in South Korea, it will be necessary to check whether the 
employees in the acquired company consider the job security as a priority issue if your company can’t 
offer a such promise. In regard to the appointment of new management, age and years of experience 
should be considered along with candidate’s capabilities. For the managers who look for new 
opportunities in Japan, it would be suitable to appoint new top management who can drive the changes 
with strong leadership.  
Together with my suggestions above, it’s important to understand that my research has 
limitations. First of all, the four cases are all from automobile industry where strong labor unions are 
well-known. For example, the practice of guaranteeing employment could be still valid in some of 
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manufacturing industries, but it couldn’t be applicable to other industries such as service industry in 
South Korea. Also, I researched only four cases, which means that the findings can be different or 
reinforced by additional cases. Lastly, the cases happened in early 2000. In the perspective of 2018, 
almost 20 years later, the practices may be outdated and the perceptions the employees have can be 
different after experiencing more globalized environment. 
For the future research, it would be interesting to see how national culture of acquiring 
companies influence the integration strategy. In my research, Tata and SAIC were sensitive to learn 
the cultures of acquired companies while Renault and DaimlerChrysler were not. Also, the Renault 
managers treated the Nissan employees with respect, but the DaimlerChrysler managers were 
criticized by the Mitsubishi employees due to their arrogant attitude. This study would benefit the 
managers from acquired company to understand potential acquirers’ integration strategy which 
becomes one of considerations in the course of buyer selection.  
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